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A SURVEYOFTHESTATUSOF ANDPHILOSOPHIES
RELATINGTOCOCKPITWARNINGSYSTEMS
GeorgeE. Cooper
22701Mr. Eden Rd.
Saratoga, California 95070
INTRODUCTION
Background
The development of the airplane has been marked by steady improvement in
performance and mission capability. This improvementhas been accompaniedby
more and more complex systems, the control of which requires that the flight
crew be furnished with an ever-increasing numberof cockpit instruments,
controls, displays, and switches.
The industry has responded to problems related to the managementof
these systems by providing a variety of warning and monitoring devices. In
manycases a warning sound or light is introduced to alert the pilot to a
situation that requires his attention and that otherwise might go un-
recognized for someperiod of time. General standards have evolved in which
a different sound is used for each audio warning. Often the louder or more
distracting sound indicates the more serious condition; the use of color-
coded lights (red to indicate the need for immediate action and yellow for
delayed action) also categorize potential hazards and the appropriate
responses. The general practice has been to add warning or cautionary
devices one at a time as needs have been identified. This has led to a
proliferation of warning sounds and lights which, in some cases, may have
become counter-productive. _
Statement of the Problem
The ensuing piecemeal development of cockpit caution and warning (c/w)
devices has come about with only isolated standards or guidelines being
established for commercial aviation. Whatever standardization may have been
achieved is probably due in part to the establishment of military specifica-
tions, but the guidance they provide has little effect on the proliferation
of c/w devices in the transport cockpit. Such standards as exist within the
FAR's are scattered and unrelated largely because they have been developed
individually to meet apparent specific needs at the time and without
consideration of overall cockpit design. The military specifications have
gone somewhat further in consolidating basic standards for such cockpit
systems and the human factors elements which relate to them, but cognizant
military personnel feel that even these need revising.
There is no way Of knowing how many aircraft accidents have been
prevented by existing c/w systems; certainly some of these systems have been
at least partially effective in preventing accidents. On the other hand,
there are a number of accidents which can be attributed directly or
indirectly to the c/w systems themselves. A number of these, of course, are
related to false or erroneous warnings, especially when these occur in a
way that distracts the crew at a critical time, that is, when the crew's
complete attention should be devoted to managing the aircraft and making
decisions. One example is the case of a false stall warning that occurred
during takeoff. The warning sound was so loud that the crew could not
communicate, and the result was an attempted abort with insufficient runway
remaining.
Cockpits of some modern transports have been compared to the interior of
a cathedral because of the maze of colored lights required to convey the
multiplicity of cautions and warnings. Two basic questions appear to be
evident: First, is there any way to reverse the trend toward proliferation
of warning and cautionary devices in the cockpit? Second, based on what we
know today, are there any standards, guidelines or criteria that can be
applied to the design of warning systems in future cockpits to improve their
effectiveness?
Program Objective
The primary objective of the NASA program reported here was to take a
broad iook at current cockpit c/w systems, to examine industry philosophies
regarding c/w system design, including current efforts to improve them, and
to identify guidelines that are currently in use, delineating those which
appear to have general acceptance, those which are considered ineffective or
erroneous, and those with which there is broad disagreement as to their
validity. The results of the survey are intended to provide guidance for
NASA's research and development programs in human factors.
Method
In order to accomplish these objectives, a broad industry survey was
undertaken during which major airplane manufacturers -- those concerned with
large transports, gefieral aviation, and military aircraft -- were inter-
viewed. Also included were several military and NASA establishments that
have cognizance of cockpit design, research, and aviation safety. Finally,
a manufacturer dealiug specifically with aircraft instrumentation and
electronics was consuited. A summary of sur_ey-related visits is shown
below (a complete listing is provided in the Bibliography).
Transport aircraft manufacturers
Domestic 4
Foreign 3
Military aircraft manufacturers 4
General aviation manufacturers 2
Instrument and supporting systems manufacturers i
Government agencies
Regulatory, R & D 2
Military Service, Safety, R & D 4
NASA Centers, R & D 2
The approach taken in arranging each visit was to inform the company of
the purpose of the visit and to establish a mutually acceptable date. Upon
arrival, the interviewer would explain the purpose of the visit, indicate
that his interest was in the company's philosophy with respect to c/w
systems, its specific views with respect to standards and guidelines they had
found acceptable as well as those they had found unacceptable, and in
defining areas of conflict where different solutions and opinions were
evident. It was reasoned that as a result it should be possible to define
specific questions and problems as well as possible approaches to their
solution. It was pointed out that the purpose of the survey was not to
enable NASA or the FAA to design a system for a future aircraft but rather to
clarify problems and questions, solutions or answers to which were needed to
guide NASA research and aid industry in designing more effective cockpits
with respect to c/w systems. So that the opinions and recommendations
obtained would clearly represent those of'the persons being consulted, the
interviewer made a specific effort not to introduce his own viewpoint into
any of the conversations. It was also hoped there would be consensus with
respect to some standards and guidelines, thereby establishing some overall
acceptance and eliminating the need for research of some items.
In each case the discussion focused on the equipment or technology
available to the company in question and on those directions they felt it
important to follow. A standard list of questions was not used, but in
almost every case the discussions centered on audio, visual, an_ tactile c/w
devices; a "general" category was used for the items less specific in nature.
This report discusses the subject by combining or contrasting the inputs from
various organizations under each of these categories.
RESULTS
Tables i, 2, and 3 list those guidelines or philosophies that were
specifically mentioned during the survey program. Those mentioned most often
in the separate interviews are listed first, with the remainder following in
approximately decreasing order. Guidelines with general acceptance are given
in table i; general acceptance means that the guideline as stated was
supported by the majority of those interviewed and that very little, if any,
opposition was voiced. Table 2 lists those guidelines that were strongly
supported by a minority, with few or no contrary opinions expressed by others;
this means only that these guidelines were not mentioned by the majority,
not that there is no controversy associated with them. Table 3 lists those
guidelines that received mixed reactions; they are listed separately to
indicate that a marked difference of opinion exists. More than one-third of
those interviewed expressed some opposing view.
TABLE i.- GUIDELINES WITH GENERAL ACCEPTANCE
General
i. "Flight crews of current transport aircraft are overwarned."
2. "Immediate action warnings should be kept to a minimum."
3. "Both an audio warning and a visual indication of failure are generally
required."
4. "Reiiability of c/w systems is extremely important."
"Warnings or signals that actuate too often are useless as c/w devices."
5. "Standards or guidelines are needed for warning systems."
6. "Warnings should be prioritized; some warnings should be inhibited
during critical phases of flight.".
7. "New Warning system additions to the cockpit should be thoroughly
evaluated before being placed in service."
"Full mission simulation should be used to study the human factors."
8. "It should be possible to cancel most warnings."
9. "Electronic display, computer logic, and checklist monitoring are
desirable advances, as is the positive trend toward computers and more
automatic systems."
i0. "Air crew workload is often too high."
"The major air crew task is to fly the airplane" (not to operate
systems).
"More flight engineer duties and aircraft systems should be automated."
Auditory
i. "Audio warnings or signals should be limited to four or five."
2. "Continued loud sounds tend to incapacitate."
3. "Voice warnings are desirable."
"It is acceptable for all audio warnings to come from a single source
and to be electronically generated."
TABLE i.- Concluded.
i.
.
3.
Visual
"A central warning system is needed in the cockpit."
"All visual warnings should be concentrated within a 30 ° visual cone."
"Anything displayed on the central warning or caution panel must also be
displayed somewhere else."
"A darkened cockpit is favored for normal operations."
"Lighting intensity and contrast are a serious problem in c/w systems."
TABLE 2.- GUIDELINES RECOMMENDED BY A FEW BUT OVERLOOKED BY MOST
General
i. "Configuration warning is necessary for certain flight phases."
2. "Most urgent warnings should be related to the control involved."
3. "A requirement exists for additional warnings, that is, attitude,
turbulence, wind shear and collision avoidance."
Auditory
i. "Audio warnings should be used for pilot error situations only."
2. "A radio override switch is needed to reduce interference by c/w systems."
3. "Voice warnings should be advisory in nature."
Visual
I. "The value of large, easy-to-read lettering or messages in a c/w system
has been under-emphasized."
2. "A third color in addition to red and yellow is needed in caution/warning
systems."
"The use of all colored lights in the cockpit should be standardized."
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TABLE 3.- GUIDELINES WITH MIXED REACTION AND ACCEPTANCE
General
i. "An improved c/w system for retrofit is desirable."
2. "Reverse the trend toward teaching pilots basic systems only (BSO), that
is, prccedures only without a thorough knowledge of the aircraft systems."
Visual
i. "A master warning light should be used."
2. "The annunciator panel should display only system malfunctions and not
pilot errors."
3. "Flashing lights should be used in c/w systems."
"Flashing lights are excellent attention-getters but are seriously
distracting."
"Variation in flash rate should be used to indicate criticality."
Tactile
i. "The use of tactile warnings should be extended in order to diversif_
the inputs to the pilot."
DISCUSSION
In the following sections, the guidelines and philosophies are used as
the basis on which discussion is conducted under the subheadings of general,
audio, visual, and tactile. Where helpful in illustrating a point, actual
examples drawn from the interviews are also presented. Recommendations for
research or future study derive from the interviews.
Comments or conclusions expressed in this section of the report are
generally from the persons interviewed, unless identified otherwise. In the
following Analysis and Comment section conclusions of the author are also
included.
Generally Accepted Guidelines: General
i. "Flight crews of current transport aircraft are overwarned." There
was almost universal agreement with this statement. The only exception
found was with the manufacturers of the smaller general aviation aircraft
which so far ha_e escaped the proliferation of warning and alerting lights
and sounds. These manufacturers, however, did recognize the beginning of a
trend in this direction. They were more concerned, however, about
increasing regulation, which requires more and more instrumentation and
special equipment to operate in today's airspace. There were few who thought
more warning devices were needed. It was apparent, however, that they were
anticipating future development for collision avoidance, turbulence,
altitude, and windshear warnings. This comment was therefore interpreted to
mean that new requirements for warning and alerting devices may be required
but that in the overall picture the total number must somehow be reduced
and/or incorporated in the cockpit with more concern for the human factors
involved. One manufacturer felt that we could be creating more hazards than
solutions by the addition of more and more warning and alerting devices.
Another opinion expressed was that aircrew members are becoming warning-
dependent because of the trend toward providing a warning for every possible
pilot transgression or error. One manufacturer indicated that this
appeared to be associated with the trend toward teaching pilots the basic
systems only, that is, teaching procedures without a thorough knowledge of
the aircraft systems, and that this was a fundamental error. This subject
is further discussed later in the section on Mixed Reaction and Acceptance.
2. "Immediate action warninss should be kept to a minimum." The
implication here was that too many immediate action warnings will render
immediate response impossible or force pilot action that could be in error.
A maximum of i0 was referred to_ Most comments were not specific but
endorsed the concept. While it was not always stated in the same words,
there was a desire expressed to see a drastic reduction in the number of red
lights or other immediate action warnings. With one transport aircraft, the
red and yellow annunciator panels were separated, and each pilot had his
own red emergency warning panel located at the side. It was necessary for
both the pilot and copilot therefore to look to the left or right side panel
to ascertain the problem after first being alerted by his own centrally-
located master warning light. The large number of red lights in this panel
was considered quite undesirable.
One Air Force spokesman would like to see the large amount of prime
in%trument panel space now devoted to c/w lights reduced. The trend toward
the master warning light and central panel (with up to i00 lights) is
dictated by a requirement for some rational organization which can be better
managed by the crew.
3. "Both an audio warnin$ and a visual indication of failure are
Benerally required." It was generally agreed that more than one channel of
input should be used to assure reception of a warning by the crew. The most
commonly used combination is audio plus visual, but in this context a
tacile warning could be used with either visual or audio in certain cases.
One concept advanced for the use of multiple warnings was that the audio
signal alerts and the visual signal identifies the problem. There appears to
be merit in this concept, but there are others who recommend the use of
flashing lights rather than audio signals for alerting the pilot. In the
author's opinion, there also appears to be merit in considering the alerting
function as separate and distinct from the information and action function
of a c/w system, but this will be discussed further in the Analysis section.
4. "Reliability of c/w systems is extremely important."
"Warnings or signals that actuate too often are useless as c/w
devices." Nuisance warnings, whether caused by unreliable systems or by
design error, contribute to a pilot's ignoring an indication when it is a
real one. The example mentioned most often in this regard relates to the
altitude alert, wherein, the alert signal, both light and tone, are excited
as much as i000 to 1200 ft prior to reaching the set altitude. This was
considered an objectional feature by a great majority of those interviewed
and considered desirable by only a very small percentage of pilots. If a
warning sounds too often, it was pointed out, the pilot develops the habit
of "punching it out" without thinking, and it loses its value. A few pilots
learn to depend on it for preventing altitude overshoot so that failure to
operate can be more serious. An auto-pilot disconnect, which actuates an
audio warning on each frequently occurring disconnect also was noted as
losing its value. True reliability, therefore, includes the human element
as well as reliability of hardware.
One of the simpler methods of ensuring reliability in the human element
lies in not having systems that "cry wolf." Such is the case when the crew
is forced repeatedly to punch out a light or silence a warning sound or dis-
regard nuisance indicators. Systems that have been so identified include
the altitude alert, the GPWS during its initial period of operation, and
lights that flash during engine start or normal system operation. A simple
solution for improving the latter has been obtained by introducing a short
time delay (50 to 75 msec) in the indicating lights of a master caution or
Warning panel. This eliminates spurious lights flashing due to aircraft
acceleration or momentary switching of electrical systems. One company which
employs this method indicated that a somewhat longer time was required in
the case of low oil pressure indications. In spite of widespread criticism
of the GPWS, one manufacturer has documented numerous instances where the
device has not only prevented potential accidents but has also detected
instrument approaches that were marginal with respect to initial approach
terrain clearance. Causes of nuisance warnings have been determined and
corrective action taken such that they are now reported by one GPWS manu-
facturer to be almost nonexistent (ref. i).
Avionics reliability was generally praised and considerable credit given
to the RTCA committee which established the criteria. The current practice
of packaging cockpit instruments and avionics separately and developing each
cockpit from the desired "modules" has certain reliability benefits, in that
failUre of one subsystem affects only that element. The additions of
altitude alerting and the GPWS are recent examples. The modular concept,
however, does have certain disadvantages. One is the adverse effects on
standardization. One company pointed out that it must be prepared to install
any one of 18 different ADI's in its aircraft, depending on customer choice.
Possible adverse effects can also occur with c/w systems in that simultaneous
operation of several warnings can result in delayed response by the crew
because they must first sort out the various indications and formulate
decisions before taking action. This is in conflict with the strong
recommendation for some method of prioritizing warnings. The Air Force now
recognizes the need for total system analysis if overall system reliability
is to be obtained. Sucha system reliability study is currently being
conducted for the Category III landing.
The high reliability achieved with avionic systems to date was given
high praise and specifically credited with the current success of the head-up
display, which combines and integrates a variety of information, that is now
in use by the military. One problem which apparently has not been completely
solved is how to remove unreliable information from a HUD. The central air
data computer (CADC)was noted as a system that has becomeextremely effective
because of its high reliability. Onefighter aircraft has been flying nearly
4 years without a single failure in its prototype.
Someof the simple systems mentioned for improving reliability are the
use of dual lamps in c/w panels for redundancy, the use of a systems' test
panel wherein the systems can be tested on the ground or during preflight,
and fail-safe circuitry design utilizing a logic system that provides
detection, through a test switch, of a broken wire or sensor problem.
New, sophisticated aircraft also contain an additional system for
improving overall reliability. Onesuch system is referred to as the BITS
(built-in-test-system), which enables an operator to trace faults throughout
a system and to isolate causes of specific failures that maybe indicated on
an annunciator panel.
The cause of a large family of nuisance warnings was illustrated during
discussions regarding space systems with astronauts and other personnel.
This was a particular problem during the Apollo program wherein manywarnings
and cautionary indications plagued the operation because the limits on many
systems were set too tight. As a result, as each system went out of limits,
a warning would occur. In a strict sense, then, most Apollo c/w's actually
were out-of-limit indications, nuisance warnings, rather than true faults.
This problem was noted to have two possible solutions: (i) To employ
a built-in test system wherein an operator can interrogate in minute detail
the various elements of a system to determine where the fault lies, and (2) ....
after using the test system to determine when a fault is merely out-of-limits
a small amount, a capability is provided allowing in-flight adjustments to
the system to reset limits and thereby reduce nuisance warnings. The
astronauts with whomthis was discussed expressed someconcern about making
these actual adjustments in flight for fear of "fouling up" a system. A
conflict therefore exists between continued acceptance of such nuisance
warnings or acceptance of the risk involved in making in-flight adjustments
to established system limits.
The space shuttle will use a special status panel to isolate faults and
determine the out-of-limits condition. It was pointed out that a dedicated
computer was required for such a software system and that the computer must
have a very large capacity for such a complex task. With respect to
redundancy in display elements, a triple CRTdisplay will be available
wherein any c/w messagecan be shownon any one of three displays.
The conflict between the continued use of separate, modular systems in
the cockpit versus combining these into a single unit and accepting
automatic pr_oritizing has been mentioned. Reliability of the single voice
warning unit which contains multiple warnings with automatic prioritizing
was reported to be very high, partly because many internal failures can occur
before readability of the message is lost.
5. "Standards or guidelines are needed for warning systems." Through-
out the survey, it was apparent that military standards regarding cockpit
design and human factors considerations (Mil. Stds. 1472 and 411D, Aircrew
Station Signals, Human Engineering Design Document) have had a significant
effect on the development of many warning systems in both civil and military
aircraft. Of those commenting, practically all specifically favored the
development of greater standardization. A few, including manufacturers of
general aviation aircraft, were concerned that this might lead to additional
regulatory requirements. A surprisingly high percentage of comments favored
the adoption of standards or guidelines for cockpit warning and alerting
devices for civil application. While no detailed comments were obtained nor
study made of the FAA standards, the feedback obtained indicated that
Federal Air Regulations (FAR) pertaining to cockpit warning and alerting
were widely scattered and more restrictive than helpful. Nevertheless, one
transport manufacturer suggested that the FAA should take the lead in
achieving greater standardization in this area for civil aircraft.
It was apparent that military specifications are not applied uniformly
5y all military contractors. This suggests that the military specifications
function effectively as guidelines to effect a degree of standardization
without seriously impairing new development. It appears probable to the
author that this could also reflect differing viewpoints of system project
officers (SPO's) or else the lack of sufficient justification being
presented by the manufacturer for a waiver or deviation. Air Force personnel
confirmed that the human factors document, Mil. Stds. 1472 (ref. 2) was a
very general one and did actually serve primarily as a set of guidelines for
the designer. The Air Force also indicated that there was a current effort
under way to revise those parts of Mil. Stds. 411D relating to "Aircrew
Station Signals" (ref. 3). The current effort recognizes the need to include
the rationale behind the specification.
The Boeing Company, under an FAA Contract, has done considerable work
in defining requirements for an independent altitude monitor. Included in
this study is a very extensive literature search that compiles a great deal
of basic human factorS data that is fundamental to cockpit design from a
man-machine integration point of view and could assist in development of
standards for civil aircraft. It includes such items as stimuli response
data, alerting philosophy, and concepts (ref. 4).
An effort is currently under way by the S-7 Committee of the Society
of Automotive Engineers not only to revise SAE Standards for civil aircraft
but also to provide design guidelines for improved future c/w systems
(ref. 5). There would appear to be distinct advantages in maintaining some
level of coordihation 5etween the S-7 Committee effort and the military.
i0
Currently, this occurs through common civil-military contractors. While
identical standards are probably not obtainable and may not even be
desirable, there are many areas where, because of basic human factors
involved, there will be agreement with respect to guidelines and criteria.
6. "Warnings should be prioritized; some warnings should be inhibited
during critical phases of flight." Both of these guidelines also relate to
the reduction of emergency warnings to less than i0. There was general
agreement that an individual crew member can handle one emergency at a time
and that additional extra warnings distract him from the task at hand. As a
result, there was unanimity of opinion that it should be possible to cancel
most warnings. Some means, however, must often be retained in certain
situations for decision-making and prioritizing by the crew.
On a number of new aircraft, such as the Concorde and A-300, a takeoff
inhibit mode is provided where the pilot may cut out all but a few critical
warnings during the takeoff phase. Such a system reduces the potential
distraction during a critical period and eliminates the possibility of
aborting the takeoff without sufficient reason. On one foreign aircraft,
fire warning is actually inhibited during the takeoff phase. One con-
tributing factor has been the large number of false fire warnings. Another
was concern about the possibility of shutting down the wrong engine, which
has been and often still is a possibility. Even conducting cleanup checks
on the engine after a shutdown has a certain potential for affecting the
wrong engine. Finally, it was concluded that an engine fire can usually be
better handled in the air than on the ground during an abort. This remains
a controversial subject, however.
Inhibit capability is, in reality, a form of prioritizing, and the
ability to cancel certain warnings is a manual means of inhibiting. While
there was some concern about carrying prioritizing too far, the capability
of inhibiting during certain mission phases appeared to be universally
acceptable. The concern relates to the fact that the pilot should always
retain the final authority for establishing priorities. With multiple
failures, however, it would appear desirable that he receive additional help.
An extreme example of this would be the case involving Apollo 13 when an
emergency caused by the explosion of an oxygen bottle in the command module
created a "domino" situation which resulted in the entire panel being alight
with warning and caution lights. The complex effects of this emergency
could be sorted out only by use of a team of experts working with the backup
vehicle as a simulator back on earth. By careful simulation, determining
causes and effects, the scientists, engineers, and technicians on the ground
were able to determine the extent of the damage, what systems were affected,
and the risks involved either in continuing flight or returning to Earth as
soon as possible. The point is that it was not possible to deduce from all
the lights exactly what proper emergency action should be.
Once inhibiting is accepted as a means of reducing the number of
warnings the pilot is subject to, there are several ways open for its
implementation. One is through manual inhibiting by flight phases, relying
on crew action for activation. The other is by use of a computer which uses
ii
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warnings as well as determining the level of warning that needs to be
displayed. By this it is meant that failure of a first system might result
in a caution, whereas failure of a second system would result in an emergency
warning. This concept has been carried forward even further with a proposal
called PAWS (Phase Adapted Warning System) (ref. 6). In this case a switching
logic module receives information from the central annunciator panel and some
other sensors (i.e., airspeed, altitude, etc.). It then can produce one of
three possible outputs to the warning lights: red for immediate action,
yellow meaning "caution or delayed action," or a third signifying "hold,"
but without any audio or visual display or action signified.
7. "New warning system additions to the cockpit should be thoroughly
evaluated before being placed in service."
"Full mission simulation should be used to study the human factors."
Due to evolutionary development and piecemeal additions of c/w items,
insufficient attention has been devoted to the human factors aspects of the
resulting cockpit in terms of overall workload requirements and pilot
acceptance of the c/w system. While testing of some individual components
may have been extensive, the resulting combinations have been subjected only
to the operational evaluation obtained from actual line or service use. The
majority of those interviewed expressed the need for a more thorough evalua-
tion of proposed changes to cockpit warning and alerting systems before
placing them in service.
It was felt that if this had been done, many of today's problems
wduld have been identified and analyzed much earlier, thereby enabling either
correction or discontinuation of unsuitable c/w methods. In addition, a
degree of testing in the operational environment is usually required to
ensure system reliability and elimination of most nuisance warnings.
Although the comments received differed in form, they supported, in
general, this guideline. Some were more specific in stating that such an
evaluation program must be objective in nature and should be conducted by
an unbiased group.
It must be stated, however, that there was evidence of considerable
testing being done by manufacturers, military agencies, and others to guide
specific cockpit designs and acceptance of new technology. The cases in
which these efforts failed or were incomplete seem to be related to the lack
of the total workload concept in the evaluations, such as would be provided
by full mission simulation. Recent studies have shown that such methods do
have the capability of providing realistic workloads and, more important,
of eliciting the same actions, reactions, and decisions from the flight crew
as the actual flight task would.
8. "It should be possible to cancel most warnings." This guideline
stems also from the proliferation of warnings and applies to both the visual
and audio systems. Any device which is sufficiently attention-getting to
alert a crew member also has the potential for creating a highly distractive
environment. This conflict appears to many to be resolvable only by
12
providing the pilot with a meansof cancelling the warning signal once it has
accomplished its primary purpose of alerting. Someof those interviewed were
concerned that a warning which cannot be cancelled except by correction of
the fault has a tendency to force the pilot into precipitous action which
might be erroneous. Extremely loud or visually distracting alerting systems
can interfere with cockpit communication, decision making, and crew
coordination. In such cases, cancellation of the warning becomesessential
prior to taking corrective action.
9. "Electronic display_ computer logic_ and checklist monitoring are
desirable advances, as is the positive trend toward computers and more
automatic systems." These guidelines will be discussed together. While these
trends are recognized and appear acceptable to the industry, there is some
concern about what the limits to automation and sophisticated computers
really are.
Recent work by Boeing, known as the Automatic Systems Monitor (ASM)
program, in which CRT's were utilized in a 737 simulator study to explore the
replacement of basic engine instruments and the application to providing
better checklists, is very encouraging. This program also made use of full
mission simulation as an evaluation technique. The results of the Boeing
work also appear to have influenced the design of the space shuttle cockpit,
in that three CRT's are being used there as a means of improving the
information display for the astronauts. The astronauts who evaluated the
Boeing program were particularly impressed by the way information was split
on the CRT, providing not only basic warning information in the upper half
but also displaying, in the lower part of the display, the action to be
taken. Another concept employed in the Boeing ASM program included the
provision for displaying the layout of any given system, together with
associated procedures, in response to an inquiry by a pilot. It was
emphasized that much work is still required on how best to display the
information so that the pilot can rapidly assess the problem and appraise
wh&t he is doing. The mere lifting of tables and instructions from manuals
is not considered to be an acceptable solution. :,,
The use of computers will be vital to future c/w systems if such
apparently desirable features as prioritizing and inhibiting by phase of
flight are adopted. It was also pointed out that the big advantage in the
use of digital equipment lies in its self-monitoring capability, available
without additional equipment.
In modern, sophisticated vehicles such as the space shuttle, a
limitation in computer capacity can be encountered which places practical
limits on the extension of caution and warning systems to handle everything
considered desirable. Complex computer systems have been employed on recent
aircraft, such as C-5 and B-I, to enable isolation of faults in response to
c/w indications. While problems have been encountered in the use of such
complex systems during operational phases, indications are that, given
sufficient support, computers will play an important part in enabling
on-board isolation of the detailed causes of c/w indications. Central
integrated test systems, for example, are reported to be extremely effective
13
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and reliable in this regard if properly maintained. Such systems become more
important as the operation of more and more aircraft systems is conducted
automatically, leaving fewer indications to the crew, other than that a fault
exists within a given system.
i0. "Air crew workload is often too high."
"The major air crew task is to fly the airplane" (not to operate
systems).
"More flight engineer duties and aircraft systems should be automated."
The significance of the high aircrew workload under certain flight conditions
and its effect on crew-member response to the c/w systems is illustrated by
the following example. During takeoff, a senior pilot was informed that an
engine would be cut on him at some point for his evaluation of handling
characteristics and safety. During the takeoff an actual fire warning
occurred, but the pilot was so intent on handling the engine out that he
failed to recognize the engine fire, even though all warnings were provided.
Other examples were noted in which pilots failed to hear warning sounds or to
observe warning lights under conditions of high stress and concentration.
This, of course, was a primary reason for the recommendation that multiple
channels be used to provide c/w signals. The conclusion is evident, therefore,
that under high stress and workload conditions there is probably no way that
one can be assured of a warning being recognized and acted on properly by a
pilot. Crew coordination and monitoring procedures, therefore, assume a much
greater importance. There can be no doubt that this fact has indirectly led
to some of the existing problems, such as the use of many loud audio tones
ahd sounds, and centrally located flashing or steady red and amber lights.
All were designed to insure catching the pilot's eye or ear, but primarily
causing a distraction and adding to the workload.
Generally Accepted Guidelines: Auditory
I. "Audio warnings or signals should be limited to four or five." Of
all recommendations made by those interviewed, this one was mentioned most
often. One concludes that there is universal consensus that audio warnings
must be reduced in total number and in types of sounds.
It was not uncommon for aircraft to have i0 to 12 different audio
sounds, and in some aircraft the number of tones exceeded 30 or 40. There
is little wonder, then, that concern was expresse d about identifying a given
tone with a given warning. It was pointed out that some sounds might be
reduced by inhibiting them except for a critical flight regime for which
the warning was needed. Because of the many audio signals in use, it was
recommended by some that preflight familiarization with them was essential.
Others were not in favor of this, believing that this was more distractive
than helpful, and as a solution recommended the overall reduction of sounds.
Military Specifications provide no standards in this regard. As a_
result, innumerable pilot evaluation programs have been conducted to
determine which sounds will be used on each aircraft. The result has been
a proliferation in number as well as in different types of signals
throughout the industry.
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Onesolution that has been incorporated in somerecent foreign
transports has been the use of a single alerting tone (gong) for either
all warnings and cautions or just warnings. The only objection found to
this was the fact that many feel it important to retain, because of their
long history of use, the bell and horn used for fire and landing gear
warnings.
It was pointed out that a reduction in the numberof audio warnings
could be effected by eliminating all audio signals from cautions or lower
level advisories. This, however, remains controversial. Even if a single
alerting sound is used, there was a question of whether it should be steady,
intermittent, or automatically cancelled after a given period.
There was a plea from a significant number of those interviewed for
development of somestandards in this regard; it was recognized that some
additional objective evaluation program might be necessary.
2. "Continued loud sounds tend to incapacitate." It was pointed out
that, if a pilot is unable to cancel or diminish a loud alerting sound
except by correction of the fault, he is very apt to be pushed into
precipitous action, thereby inadvertently taking incorrect action.
This philosophy of continued loud warning sounds was frequently
emphasized and has led to certain recommendations. One is that the pilot
should be able to inhibit or cancel any audio tone. Another is that the
pilot should have control over the intensity of the sounds. Both of these
have been factors in known aircraft accidents. Current military standards
require that any warning sound must have a sound level higher than the
maximum ambient noise at the warning frequency. While this has a certain
rationale, it could require sound levels that are highly distractive and
which could incapacitate the crew. _ile the ability to cancel a warning
has already been discussed as highly desirable, the provision of an
intermittent signal, for example on i0 sec, off i0 sec, was recommended as a
solution in some cases, since it would at least provide brief periods of
freedom from the distractive sound during whichcoherent thought could be
resumed. Recommendations were also received that a I0 sec audio signal
should be sufficient for alerting purposes and that it should be auto-
matically cancelled after this or some other experimentally determined
interval. Conflicting opinions were also received with respect to an audio
signal for autopilot disconnect, which often was considered a nuisance.
This was partially resolved, however, by the difference in consequence and
hazard associated with such a disconnect on different aircraft or flight
regimes.
3. "Voice warnings are desirable."
"It is acceptable for all audio warnings to come from a single
source and to be electronically generated."
The problems associated with having too many auditory signals no doubt
enhances the desirability of verbal warnings. The problem of associating
various sounds in audio signals with a particular failure is eliminated if
a voice message is used to tell the pilot clearly what has happened. The
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Air Force indicated that research has shown that there is a 6 to 9 sec im-
provement in recognition through the use of such direct cues, a concept
which they favor highly. There were essentially no objections to the concept
of voice warning even though many of those interviewed had no direct
experience.
One statement was that pilots want and need more information through
the auditory channel. Many pilots themselves concluded that voice is the
way to go because a message clearly stated reduces acceptance time, even
though they would also want a backup visual identification. Air Force pilots
indicate that their heavy reliance on a visual c/w system is simply the
result of having too many tones to identify and relate to. Therefore, the
direct, simple solution is the use of "plain English" in the c/w system.
There were no recommendations for the use of voice warning except in con-
junction with some type of visual system. There were few limitations placed
on the use of verbal messages in a c/w system except insofar as auditory
signals were generally recommended for warnings rather than cautions.
Military standards actually limit the use of voice to warnings only and
require a separate alerting tone to precede it.
One of the concerns with respect to voice warnings was why, after the
initial research and applications in a B-58 years ago, it had never been
implemented. In talking with B-58 pilots who had experience with the system,
no real objection could be found except that it was a tape-driven system,
somewhat unreliable due to development problems initially, but that it had
done a good job in supplementing the information from a poorly located
caution panel. This panel was located to the left and rear of the pilot
and could be seen only by turning the head and looking low and to the rear.
One report was that there was a strong tendency to make use of the voice
information with the B-58 and to ignore the visual, which is not too
difficult to understand considering the location of the annunciator panel.
One study conducted by the Air Force was reported to have shown that
98% of those interrogated favored voice warning, based on their B-58
experience. This is in spite of the fact that this taped system was
considered an inferior one and was earlier fraught with reliability problems.
The primary problem of introducing voice in military aircraft appears
to be one of paying the added cost of equipping a prototype with a voice
system without having data on the benefits. So far, the simplest approach
has been to go along with the standard audio-visual warning system composed
of sounds and lights. At least two recent Air Force aircraft programs
included plans for a voice warning system on a prototype, but both had been
cancelled to conserve funds. Voice warnings have been used quite
effectively in missile crew work. One difference was noted, however: the
conditions surrounding a missile launch represent a more static rather than
dynamic situation such as that present during aircraft operation.
There were a number of researchable questions raised involving the
application of voice warning. Military Standard 411D specifies verbal.
warnings for immediate action items only, whereas some responses anticipate
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a broader application. One concern is the possible interference with or by
ATC, other radio communications, or from internal cockpit communications.
The earlier proposals to use a feminine voice, which would be more readily
recognized and discernible, is no longer valid because of the increasing use
of women in control towers and ATC. Electronically generated voices,
however, have the potential for being altered through a frequency tone makeup
which could be quite different and therefore more readily recognized from
the various communications systems. Some concern still exists about the use
of proper terminology in voice warnings. The possible differences in
interpretation of certain words and phrases by different individuals,
particularly by those of different nationalities, were considered to indicate
that continuing tests should be conducted until such points are resolved.
One concern expressed was that an adequate voice warning system would require
a large computer prioritized by phase of flight. This is somewhat in
conflict with other opinions which indicate that a small, compact,
electrically generated voice system would be extremely easy to retrofit and
would have sufficient capability for current transport aircraft.
A serious problem facing the use of a single electronic generator for
voice warning appeared to be inertia in the aviation system that must be
overcome to enable acceptance of such a change. The need for prioritizing
also appears to be very important if the full capability of electronic voice
is to be achieved. Currently there are a number of impediments to the
adoption of prioritizing. One is the present trend toward the modular
development of electronics in separately packaged boxes which are not as
conducive to prioritizing and could allow simultaneous warnings to be
sounded. Assuming as fact the conclusion that a pilot can handle only one
warning at a time and must ultimately resort to his own prioritizing in the
case of multiple failures, the majority foresaw no serious problem with
prioritizing as long as it is done sensibly and the pilot is informed that
additional warnings await recognition. The second impediment is the conflict
with some existing regulatory requirements dealing with audio signals,
including the use of voice, which require resolution. General opinion has
been seen to favor a dual audio-visual warning system. A few of those who
were most emphatically in favor of voice warning felt that such a system
could stand by itself without the visual backup. This is a researchable
question requiring justification.
With respect to pilot acceptance, there was strong sentiment expressed
that voice warnings should be advisory in nature rather than commanding.
Pilots almost universally appreciated advisories such as "Glide slope, glide
slope," indicating an out-of-limits deviation, but considerable objection
was raised to the command, "Pull up, pull up." This is discussed more fully
under the specific guideline on the subject.
In summary, voice warning was recommended strongly as offering a great
potential for improving cockpit warning systems, either through retrofit or
as part of an advanced system. Unless prioritizing as a concept can be
established, however, much of the benefit potentially available from
electronic voice generators may not be realized. While some experimental
work has been completed giving insight into the basic elements of voice
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messages, an evaluation study of voice warning, incorporating varied
terminology and including other audio signals, both advisory and of a
command nature, was recommended.
Generally Accepted Guidelines: Visual
i. "A central warning system is needed in the cockpit."
"All visual warnings should be concentrated within a 30 ° visual cone."
"Anything displayed on the central warnin$ or caution panel must
also be displayed somewhere else."
These statements reflect the necessity for ensuring that visual warnings do
not go undetected. The current trend is to place all red warning lights
within a 30 ° cone of vision and to centralize visual caution signals within
a central annunciator panel even if this does not lie within the 30 = cone.
In concept this appears rational except for the proliferation of lights and
the need to extend beyond the 30 ° cone in some cases because of central panel
space limitations. This leads in turn to a requirement for master warning
lights, either red or yellow, or both. The competition for central panel
space is so severe that little or no consistency has been achieved in either
the location of warning lights or of annunciator panels. The result has
been that most red warning lights are scattered about the forward panel,
generally within the visual cone, but separated with some on the glareshield,
some on the panel, some on either side of the console. This is also true on
fighter aircraft where landing gear warnings are often well outside this
cone.
The basic visual warning system philosophy using colored lights follows
the arrangement described as follows: Primary alerting is obtained through
red and/or amber master lights located within the 30 ° cone, preferably near
each ADI, as a means of catching both the pilot's and copilot's attention.
The military specifications, however, require they not be within the basic
group of flight instruments. If a master yellow light is used, it merely
directs attention to the primary annunciator panel, the lights on which are
sometimes referred to as "director" lights because they direct attention to
other yellow lights, usually outside the 30 ° cone. These third level
yellow lights are located, as'a rule, with the particular system or control
to which they relate. In this manner, the pilot's attention is ultimately
directed to the specific system which has failed. Supposedly, he will know
where this panel is located even though it may be to the rear or on a flight
engineer's panel. Arrows are sometimes used to indicate general location
of the system in question. These are often located in places difficult to
reach or otherwise inaccessible to normal vision.
Additional red warning lights are positioned wherever space can be
found on the forward panel or glareshield. As additional emergency warnings
are added, more red lights are necessary. On military fighters, the rim of
the glareshield is normally used. Panels used for c/w's take on a variety
of forms. On some the red and yellow lights are separated by grouping; on
others they are mixed, and in some cases separate red and yellow panels are
used. If a central location cannot be obtained, quite often either the red
18
or amber panel will be duplicated so that both pilot and copilot have one.
A master warning light becomes necessary when some warning lights cannot
be centrally located within easy view of either pilot.
In general, the system of warning lights described here, when properly
implemented, were noted to be "not too bad," "reasonable," or "acceptable."
Properly implemented refers to readable labels or messages on the lights,
red emergency lights well located for each pilot, and central annunciator
panel also easily viewed by both pilots. This system allows caution and
warning systems involving large numbers of lights (30-100) to at least
become reasonably manageable.
In order to achieve compliance with the 30 ° visual cone, it has become
necessary on most military aircraft to mix red and amber lights in the
central zone. Examination of these c/w lights, which are clustered about
the ADI, or at least within this 30 ° cone, reveals that, with the exception
of a master caution light, they relate, on the newer aircraft, primarily to
pilot items, that is, pilot failure or error items. This mixture would
appear to reflect a guideline suggested by some to the effect that "Only
systems malfunctions should be shown on the annunciator panel." While the
latest labeled-light concepts employed on the most recent military aircraft
were considered generally acceptable, steps for improvement were still
requested.
"Anything displayed on the central warning or caution panel must also
be displayed somewhere else," was a philosophy also stated in the reverse,
which says that any caution or warning displayed anywhere in the cockpit
should also be shown on the corresponding central panel. For example, a
master warning/caution light might indicate by color a caution which directs
attention to a central annunciator panel. Here the system in question
(i.e., electric, hydraulic, etc.) is identified by an illuminated, labeled
light. Reference is then made to the electrical panel where it becomes
apparent that No. 2 generator, for example, is out, and where action, if
necessary, is to be taken.
In the case of warnings, it was obviously desirable to reduce the
total number of lights involved; for example, in case of fire, a red light
comes on in the actual fire handle, which at once identifies the particular
engine on fire and tells the pilot where his fire suppression handle is.
If not incorporated in the fire handle, good practice calls for illuminating
the particular engine fuel shutoff valve which may be located separate from
the fire handle. This precludes shutting off the fuel to the wrong engine.
What has not been considered here is the case where all information for
alerting, identification, and action may be provided on a central panel --
a situation usually unattainable because of panel space limitations -- or
that requires a computer-generated display.
2. "A darkened cockpit is favored for normal operations." A cockpit
which is alight with any c/w indication during normal operation or without
cause is generally considered distracting and detracts from a pilot's ability
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to detect change. Several guidelines were recommended for achieving this
concept. Do not tell the pilot something that is good by any type of
warning or cautionary device. Do not provide any type of signal if whatever
is involved needs to be on during any major portion of the flight. Only
annunciate when a system is off so that a light would be on only if there
has been a failure or something has been turned off which normally should be
on.
In general, pilots favor the darkened cockpit concept wherein, during
normal operation, no c/w or status lights are showing. There were some
exceptions, however; a few pilots indicated they favored advisory lights
which indicate that specific modes or conditions were in operation. There
may be a real conflict here unless further investigation uncovers some simple
guidelines for the use of blue, green, and white indicator lights. This is
discussed more fully in a subsequent section.
In general aviation aircraft, which are just beginning to encounter the
addition of lights and c/w indications, many of the new lights dealt with
navigation equipment. For example, green for all NAV Systems on, white for
DME, and additional lights indicating auto-pilot and flight director modes.
If the darkened concept is truly valid, some resolution of the extensive
use of colored lights in these areas must be obtained.
3. "Lighting intensity and contrast are a serious problem in c/w
systems." This appeared to be a greater problem in military aircraft having
bubble-type canopies where extremely high contrast occurs due to direct
sunlight at high _ititude falling across a portion of the instrument panel.
Cockpit lighting mockups have often been used to ensure acceptability of
the cockpit design. The other problem which also can occur in transport
aircraft is that of the high ambient light during a low visibility approach
in fog. Comments were received which indicated that, with this high outside
light level, interior cockpit lights often were not seen. These problems
lead to other controversial questions, such as should the pilot have control
over dimming of c/w lights in the cockpit. General aviation aircraft use a
straightforward photo-electric cell to sense the ambient light and to adjust
the intensity of cockpit lights automatically _ At least one military
fighter has adopted a _heostat control to al!ow the pilot to reduce lighting
Voltage and intensity even further than that normally provided by the
reduction from 28 to 14 V in a tW0-ste p System. On the other hand, there is
concern about giving pilots dimming control through a rheostat because, I
presume, of the PoSsibility of a light being inadvertently left dim when it
should be bright. Design techniques to eliminate this possibility should be
possible, one military contractor indicates that current technology and
design practices can and have eliminated the problem of achieving desired
contrast by special treatment of the warning light surface. Some
contractors felt that NASA should develop standards and techniques for
determining brightness, contrast, and color compliance.
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Guidelines Recommended by a Few But Overlooked by Most: General
i. "Configuration warning is necessary for certain fligh t phases."
(i.e., takeoff and landing) This recommendation was prompted in one case
because over a hundred takeoffs had been made in the wrong aircraft
configuration due to a human factor in cockpit design and layout. In this
case, if the electric actuator was used for setting the takeoff trim and the
hydraulic trim wheel was in another position, the stabilizer would move to
the hydraulic setting when hydraulic power subsequently came on, thereby
destroying the pilot's initial, supposedly proper, setting. During landing,
the primary configuration warning required is the landing gear horn and
light. Primary objections to these warnings relate to the fact that on many
aircraft they come on any time the throttle is retarded, regardless of
flight phase. This becomes a nuisance to the entire crew and a repeated
distraction to the second officer. The solution mentioned most often is to
restrict landing gear horn to appropriate speed and altitude ranges for
landing and reduce unwanted occurrences at other times. A variable wing
sweep aircraft was involved in several accidents because flaps were
unattainable when selected unless the wings were completely unswept. A
landing configuration warning was added that remedied the situation.
2. "Most urgent warnings should be related to the control involved."
Whenever the intent of this guideline can be met, it provides a direct cue
which, in general, is unmistakable and enables the pilot to react
instinctively. Of the warnings related to control involved, the stick-shaker
is the one in most general use and the one most accepted as a good example
of the applicatiotl of tactile warning. In this case it is related directly
to the control involved. One example of a situation wherein the stick-shaker
was not favored was the F-Ill in which a rudder-shaker was used instead. In
this case the results were far from satisfactory as it was found that, due to
improved handling characteristics, many pilots no longer flew with their
feet on the rudders throughout much of the flight envelope. A second
objection to the stick-shaker concept lies in the concept of vehicles with a
stability and control augmentation system (SCAS) wherein a force transducer
or pickoff is used to transmit the control input into_a_ electronic control
system. It is reasoned that spurious force inputs caused by a stick-shaker
would be prohibitive in such a system.
This guideline need not be restricted to tactile warnings but also
suggests that urgent warnings should not be lost in the middle of a central
or master warning panel. It also relates to the recommendations which were
made to the effect that warnings related to pilot control, such as "pull
up," should be located close to the instrument that the pilot is using, such
as the ADI. As discussed elsewhere, some individuals even go so far as
saying that the pilot-error type of warning must be integrated directly
into the display being used. If it is related to flight path, then it should
be evident in the flight-path control bar or indication; if in heading, then
with the heading indication.
Fire warning lights located in the extinguisher handle and system caution
(inoperative/failed) lights located at the switch or lever which controls
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that system are other examples. Where these are not readily visible,
that is, where they are outside a 30 ° cone of vision, for example, some
separate means of alerting the pilot is needed. The particular method used
may also be a function of urgency.
3. "A requirement exists for additional warnings, that is, attitude,
turbulence, wind shear, and collision avoidance." Several recommendations
and/or prediction s were made to this effect. Of primary concern at this
point, however, is the simplification and design of an improved warning
system utilizing guidelines that will enable the future addition of such
warnings as their need becomes apparent and the technology is provided for
their development. In other words, future cockpit design must allow for the
incorporation, without adding to the distractions and confusion, of a few
more important warnings.
Two examples of other warnings which have been incorporated in response
to specific requirements were provided. The Concorde supersonic transport
incorporates Mach number and center of gravity indicators and warnings to
alert and advise the pilot when approaching established limits too closely.
One recent military aircraft uses an auditory signal of varying frequency to
warn the pilot of an approaching yaw departure and incipient spin condition.
Comparative warning systems are needed for certain critical instruments.
Merely having redundancy in instruments or systems does not ensure prompt
recognition and action. It was emphasized that a "comparator system" to
_rovide an immediate alert to the pilot at the controls, is needed on many
aircraft in order to reduce to an acceptable level the time required to
recognize certain instrument failures. To a degree this has already been
discussed under the paragraph concerned with reliability. A requirement now
exists for attitude comparators on large multi-place military aircraft.
Guidelines Recommended by a Few But Overlooked by Most: Auditory
i. "Audio warnings should be used for pilot error situations only."
This may be related to the guideline that recommends that only system
malfunctions should be shown on a master warning panel. This appears to be
based on a desire to organize warnings in a more logical way. If one
accepts other guidelines, which state _that audio warnings should be reserved
for emergency situations only_ this one implies that pilot error warnings
are the most serious. This, of course, is not the case, as minor human
errors and misunderstandings occur through most operations but are recognized
and corrected before leading to more serious problems. There is some
question whether this guideline could be accepted and still not conflict
with others which may be more important, such as reducing the total number of
audio warnings or confining audio to emergency situations only. Some
ambiguity exists also in regard to whether voice warnings should be included
in this guideline and their use thereby restricted. Taken at face value,
this would eliminate the use of audio as an alerting device for any system
malfunction. This is perhaps beyond what was envisioned, as immediate action
warnings can arise from system failures.
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In conclusion, there appears to be somebasis for this guideline, but
at present it is too broad and controversial to be accepted at face value.
2. "A radio override switch is needed to reduce interference by c/w
systems." The question raised may be more complex than is immediately
apparent. Is the communication to be overridden in order to distinguish the
c/w signal, or voice warning? Or is it a cancellation of warning signals in
order to maintain communications? It is possible that other than emergency
audio warnings should not interfere with radio communication or should be
cancellable but that emergency warnings must remain readable in spite of the
communications system audio. From the overwhelming desire to reduce audio
signals to a minimum, it might be assumed that only those remaining emergency
ones need be heard above the normal radio communication. In cases where
audio warning signals are piped through the communications speaker or
headset, a slightly different situation exists than where only a separate
electronic voice or audio warning speaker is used.
3. "Voice warnings should be advisory in nature." From experience
with GPWS to date, there was some question as to whether a pilot will respond
without delay to a "pull up" command. The majority of pilots apparently
like the advisory "glide slope, glide slope," used in the GPWS, and object
to the command "pull up, pull up." This led to the recommendation by some
that a command like "pull up, pull up" should be preceded by a milder
advisory. There were some indications that the large numbers of nuisance
warnings which followed the rapid introduction of GPWS into service may have
contributed to these objections.
A subsequent study conducted by one GPWS manufacturer (ref. i),
however, provides a more optimistic picture, while still recognizing the
human factors involved. A few examples are: "Data on 35 GPWS-equipped
airplane incidents revealed that in more than 15 of them the pilot took
positive corrective action while under instrument conditions." "GPWS has
also detected 14 specific airport instrument approaches that were marginal."
"Unwanted or nuisance warnings during instrument conditions have been almost
non-existent." .....
There was evidence during the survey that a warning command without a
preparatory advisory was considered undesirable. However, there was an
admission that emergency situations requiring immediate action may require
a direct cue with a sense of urgency in order to reduce response time. There
still appeared to be some reaction against such oral commands as "pull up,
pull up," however. The use of a warning term like "terrain" in place of
"pull up" has been suggested and may have merit. In any case, it was
evident that the number of immediate action commands must be kept to a
minimum.
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Guidelines Recommended by a Few But Overlooked by Most: Visual
i. "The value of larse_ easy-to-read letterin$ or messages in a c/w
system has been under-emphasized." Concern was expressed by a number of
those interviewed about the readability of some labeled lights, particularly
under adverse conditions such as low contrast or turbulence. For example, a
problem identified with many annunciator panels was that the lettering was
often too small.
Reference was made to one research program involving evaluation by a
large number of airline pilots in which a particular prototype area
navigation system was used as part of the test equipment. In this case,
the lettering used was too small and resulted in the pilots having to shift
position in order to distinguish the letters. This difficulty in reading
became worse under turbulent conditions and contributed significantly to the
time required to insert information and make changes in way points. It was
concluded that these features resulted in significant adverse pilot opinion
and contributed to a lack of acceptance and realization of some test
objectives.
The difficulty of setting exact limits on lettering size for messages
is understandable because of the proliferation of annunciator and other
lights on the panel and the limited panel space available. A problem of
easy readability under normal lighting and non-turbulent conditions is
usually the rule, and design is not always controlled by the worst case.
Recommendations were obtained from one contractor who had established
standards which he felt ensured adequate visibility of labeled lights or
messages. These were the use of i/8-in letters at 28 in from the pilot's
eyes and the use of 5/8-in letters for the master caution and all red
emergency lights. Military standards only specify that the maximum viewing
distance be limited to 28 in.
One interesting approach used in a NASA flight research program involved
the use of a digital message line utilizing 1-in letters in the center of
the forward instrument panel. The feeling obtained after discussing the use
of such large, easy-to-read messages was that there could very well be some
previous under-estimation of the benefits resulting from the speed with which
visual, written or printed messages could be observed, understood, and acted
upon. Obviously, the 1-in. letters may have gone beyond what is practical and
necessary to permit rapid interpretation. It appeared highly possible that
a reduction in interpretation and action time may result if the messages
are provided in large, easy-to-read form, and further work to identify these
limits may be desirable. Application in the most flexible form, of course,
would be dependent on having a digital computer available for the generation
of discrete messages. There was a significant preference established by
those familiar with this type of digital message to the same written
message on a CRT. Opinions were also expressed in the former program that
a simple readout message appeared more acceptable to these pilots than a
voice message would be. This may also be influenced by other factors, such
as the use of command versus advisory voice messages discussed earlier.
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These questions remain controversial. With the printing on annunciator
lights often too small, there is an obvious need for a review of criteria in
this area.
2. "A third color in addition to red and yellow is needed in caution/
warning systems."
"The use of all colored lights in the cockpit should be standardized."
There were a few recommendations that another color, in addition to red and
yellow, was needed to identify a third category of warning. While red and
yellow in general refer to immediate action and deferred action items, some
feel the third color would indicate that something is not quite correct but
that no action is required. Such items are also often referred to as
advisories. Any clear-cut rules for the use of these colors was not made
apparent during the survey, and they appeared to be left largely to the
individual contractor. Even the Air Force admitted that the military
specifications should be revised with respect to definitive application of
the various colors -- red, yellow, blue, green, and white. Some recommenda-
tions were also made to the effect that a cautionary color in addition to
aviation yellow should be introduced to differentiate between cautions that
require no pilot action and those that require pilot action at a deferred
time.
A similar concept is recognized by the SAE S-7 Cor_nittee, which is
studying the need for a third level of warning as well as other colored
lights in the cockpit, whether or not they relate directly to a warning
system. Such a possible fourth level has an effect on the "darkened
cockpit" concept discussed earlier.
Heretofore, colors like blue, green, and white have been used for
advisories or to signify status of a system. This application appears to be
growing, particularly with modular navigation and display units. It is
apparent that both the civil and military favor some resolution of this
problem, and concerted, coordinated action is needed to resolve these
definitions and to identify the colors so used. CKit_ria should therefore
be redefined for each of the colored lights used in the cockpit and should
also apply to the use of light emitting diodes (LED). It was pointed out
that technology is only now developing to provide colors other than red for
LED's.
In addition to the colors already mentioned, there was a recommendation
that, in taking a new look at the use of colors, attention should be
directed to the use of combinations of red and blue as now used on many
public safety vehicles. It was pointed out that an unidentified study at
the University of Southern California indicated this to be an intolerable
combination, one which is extremely annoying and therefore quite attention-
getting. A second reason_for considering this combination was the fact that
many people are color-blind to red.
A limited number of red and yellow warning lights are used in general
aviation aircraft. Colored lights have been considered ineffective for stall
warning and therefore are being eliminated from these aircraft. An audible
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stall warning has been considered much more effective than a visual one.
Cessna has found it necessary to add two more colors in order to
differentiate the wheels up and down positions on a float plane. Here the
normal red and green lights were insufficient because of the various
combihations possible; therefore a blue light for gear-up and a brown-amber
light for gear-down were_ added to identify when floats are installed. Most
of the lights being added to these cockpits appear to be associated with
information-type advisories related to navigation and system operation.
Guidelines with Mixed Reaction and Acceptance: General
i. "An improved c/w system for retrofit is desirable." There was mixed
reaction as to the desirability of a retrofit system, and after completing
the survey, it was concluded that there was a misunderstanding as to what was
deemed to be retrofit. Retrofit could be interpreted as placing a revised
system in existing airplanes flying today, or it could be interpreted as
placing the revised system in existing aircraft models which are yet to be
produced, thereby enabling the revised system to be incorporated at the
factory. It appears that the latter would be entirely feasible, where there
are very limited possibilities of doing so in existing aircraft. The
strongest possibility in this regard, however, was noted to lie with the
electronic voice generator which, if found acceptable, could be designed so
that a single unit, tied into the necessary sensors, would be all that was
needed to be added to the cockpit. Many of the questions discussed under
V_ice warning would have to be resolved before such a system would be
accepted. This potential for retrofit of a single electronic voice generator
was considered encouraging enough to warrant considerable effort being
expended to resolve these questions.
2. "Reverse the trend toward teachin_ pilots basic systems only (BSO),
that is, procedures only without a thoroush knowledse of the aircraft
systems." This is really a question for airline training personnel, but it
also involves basic concepts of aircraft systems design. It is probably not
a subject for other than limited discussion here except that it was felt by
some to foster a "dependence on warning devices" rather than on basic
knowledge. It is of interest here because the increasing complexity of
aircraft systems and cockpit information and controls are related to the c/w
system used. The trend toward the use of on-board computers, electronic
displays, and more automatic systems was also recognized by most of those
interviewed. This problem will undoubtedly continue as an evolutionary
development in which new designs and moreautomation must be reflected in
revised training procedures, but a degree of iteration and swinging of the
pendulum will probably continue. Whether basic systems only (BSO) aggravates
or reduces the problem of c/w system design is beyond the scope of this
paper. It is mentioned here because there were strong feelings among a
number of those interviewed that this trend must be reversed and a return
made to providing flight crews with a better _understanding of their aircraft
systems so that the handling of c/w indications does not become primarily a
conditioned reflex.
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Guidelines with Mixed Reaction and Acceptance: Visual
i. "A master warnin$ lisht should be used." We first need to dis-
tinguish whether a master red warning light or a maste_-yellow caution light
is being discussed. A master caution light is generally favored because of
the fact that annunciator panels quite often are located in positions that are
out of the pilot's direct visual cone. A single yellow light to serve the
alerting purpose for cautionary indications is usually needed and is generally
accepted for the cases where the annunciator panel is remotely located.
Examples were also found where a red central warning light was needed
because all red warnings were located in a separate panel to the side of the
main instrument panel. Their use also may be dependent on whether red
warnings are grouped near the ADI and other flight instruments, in a panel
separate from yellow caution lights, or whether they are mixed into the same
central panel. Again, examples of each exist. If a trend could be
determined, it would be in line with the earlier guideline to reduce the
total number of red warnings to less than i0, thereby making it possible to
separate them from the main cautionary annunciator panel. The need, however,
by nature of red warning indications (immediate action) is to attempt to
group them as close to the ADI as is physically possible. The result there-
fore is to cluster one master cautionary light with a variety of red warnings
in this area.
Some recommendations were specific in stating that master warning panels
and master warning lights ought to be replaced with a single alerting device.
This device would be aural, visual, or both, and the c/w information
displayed on a CRT on a priority basis, supplemented by written instruction
to the pilot as to action to be taken. Other preferences were expressed by
some for separate warning and caution panels.
2. "The annunciator panel should display only system malfunctions and
not pilot errors." A similar recommendation was that there should be
separation between cautionsand warnings resulting from human failure and
those resulting from system failures and that the crew_should be able to
distinguish clearly between them. There was no clear-cut method for
accomplishing this, however. Some felt that audio warnings should be reserved
for crew failure situations.
Another recommendation was that a master warning system should be
confined to system malfunctions only. In such a system, a master warning
light, centrally located for a pilot, alerts him to a c/w indication else-
where. Several reasons for this interpretation were provided. First, any
information related to aircraft control andnavigation should be associated
with the instruments being used for this purpose. It was emphasized that the
use of isolated warning lights that are not directly associated with the
control element or information affected by crew error or deviation cause
distraction and introduce delays. One example of associating the warning
information with the instrument being used was the case where the radar
altimeter bug could be set to give a fly-up command when reaching decision
height. This eliminated any reliance on audio tones or lights. Another
example of this type of warning is the use of the flight path symbol in a
terrain-following display which, in case of failure or excessive deviation
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below glide path, automatically gives the fly-up signal. The particular
system in question also employs an adjoining red light affording a
comparison between the two procedures. The former was clearly preferred,
while the latter was considered distracting.
Carried to its ultimate conclusion, the desire to separate system
malfunctions from pilot errors maybe based on the desirability of obtaining
significant improvements to the basic flight display of information so that
the pilot has no need for auxiliary warning devices. Military experience
with integrated displays (large head-up) employing integration of all
information required for the particular task, including airspeed, altitude,
flight path angle, velocity vector, and deviation information, has shown
this is what is really needed. Until such improved displays are available,
the opinion was expressed that we would continue to have conflict between
providing sufficient warning and alerting devices and total distraction of
the pilot from his primary task.
With a computer capability, it is possible to provide a written message
pertaining to the warning in the integrated display, regardless of whether
head-up or head-do_. This was considered a desirable solution and would, of
course, be applicable to any type of electronic attitude instrument.
3. "Flashing lights should be used in c/w systems."
"Flashing lights are excellent attention-getters but are seriously
distracting." There was general agreement that flashing lights are, at the
same time, excellent attention getters but seriously distracting. There was
no agreement on how the undesirable characteristics could be minimized. For
this reason, they have been received with mixed reaction. The use of
flashing lights has also met with mixed reaction due to their excellent
visual alerting capability, but this is modified by the tendency of pilots
to cancel them immediately. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) of the United
Kgngdom favors the use of a flashing light for alerting of either a primary
(red) or a secondary (yellow) warning. It is clear that the CAA prefers a
flashing master warning light on both the captain's and first officer's
panel. On the master warning system panel, the CAA also feels that flashing
lights are desirable because they can continue to flash without becoming
as annoying as an audio signal. Further, they can be detected by peripheral
vision. The French, however, favor an audio tone for alerting, so on joint
aircraft programs an audio is added for primary warning. The airlines
object to using the same flashing concept for both red and amber lights, so
the concept of neither red nor amber flashing on the master warning system
panel has been adopted. The military does not favor the use of flashing
lights, but numerous waivers have been granted for their use in specific
cases. The Air Force feeling is that flashing lights are generally too
distracting and tend to restrict their use.
Additional work is obviously needed to determine if, when, or where
flashing lights Should be used. One solution suggested was to automatically
limit the flashing phase, after which the light reverts to a steady mode.
It has also been suggested that the use of intermittent flashing lights,
which remain on for i0 sec and then go off automatically, on a central
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warning panel could eliminate the need for the master caution or warning
light. On one recent aircraft, which uses several red-labeled warning
lights near the ADI, plus a master caution (yellow) relating to the
annunciator panel located elsewhere, the master caution light flashes until
it is pushed to cancel, whereas each red light, which is labeled, is steady.
Note that in this case the pilot and copilot are each furnished with all of
these. Someother manufacturers, including those in general aviation, also
use the concept of the master caution coming on flashing with the ability to
be punchedout. The fault still remains lighted on the annunciator panel.
The application on one GPWSwas the initial use of a steady red light
which changes to flashing later. This appears to follow the concept of
providing an advisory first and then a commandbut is counter to the concept
of flashing for alerting.
Oneconcern expressed about the use of flashing lights, at least in the
spacecraft application, is that they are extremely costly in terms of
software. They are specifically used in presentation of information on a CRT
as a meansof drawing attention to specific information in a complex display.
Pilots observed that, whenfaced with a flashing light, there is a
strong reaction to cancel the light even before they knowwhat it means.
Whether a flashing light can at the same time be a good alerting device and
yet not cause serious distraction is not clear because the effects appear to
be somewhatcontradictory. However, the ability to cancel a flashing light
removes someof the distraction. One concept is that if a flashing light is
adopted, it should be first in the flashing mode, thereby fulfilling its
alerting function, and then go steady after initial action is taken, if this
is what is desired. Somecases were found to exist wherein the light came
on steady and then movedinto a flashing mode. The option to cancel a
flashing light was considered almost as important as the ability to cancel
an audio signal.
A secondmethod of reducing the disturbing distraction of the continuous
flashing light is to automatically limit its flashing cycle. This, of
course, assumesthat it will have accomplished its alerting purpose during
the initial cycle. Whenboth an audio and visual alerting meansare used,
automatic control of the flashing cycle may be entirely adequate. Like audio
warnings, it was emphasized that flashing lights need to be kept to a minimum.
Several exampleswere noted wherein the concept of flashing first and steady
second were violated. The flashing red light is sometimes used for an engine
overheat condition with a steady red for a fire. It was noted that the
latter is more serious and requires faster response. One solution on another
aircraft was to separate the two lights and make them both steady, using
other meansto alert.
On an L-lOll aircraft, operated by a foreign carrier, both the pilot
and copilot have a master warning light which flashes until the fault is
corrected. On one recent military aircraft, the master warning is a steady
light, whereas the master Caution flashes until it is pushed to cancel,
leaving an annunciator light flashing on the central panel. One
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recommendationwas to use a flashing light on the central panel for
alerting, with automatic cancellation after i0 sec; this process could
eliminate the need for a master warning light.
The f2ashing light is also sometimes used to indicate a transient
condition, with a steady light referring to a steady condition. This led to
the recommendation that the use of flashing lights needs to be standardized.
That flash rate can be important was illustrated by military pilots
interviewed who had experience with two different recent aircraft, each of
which used a flashing light on the annunciator panel to indicate the most
recent caution or warning. On one the flash rate was high, while on the
other it was slower. The slower was strongly recommended as much easier to
read. As information on the actual flash rates was not available, it must be
assumed that the rates were within those specified by military standards.
In any case, it suggests that improved criteria with respect to human factors
in relation to the best range of flash rates appear to be needed.
Guidelines with Mixed Reaction and Acceptance: Tactile
I. "The use of tactile warninss should be extended in order to diversify
the inputs to the pilot." This is a controversial area in which there
exists a wide difference of opinion. There does appear to be some current
efforlt , evolving partly under military sponsorship, to investigate extended
use of tactile warnings in order to reduce reliance on audio and visual cues.
There also exists the opposing viewpoint that, with the exception of the
stick-shaker, there is little interest in extending the use of tactile
warnings. They are, in general, the least reliable because a pilot is not
always able to discriminate their meaning.
At least two companies, however, indicated an interest in the expanded
use of tactile warnings and referred to work being conducted at Ohio State
University with a control stick grip that makes use of tactile inputs to the
pilot, and to Air Force interest in the application of body pressure through
segmented pneumatic seat and back cushions.
One of the desirable aspects of the stlck-shaker is the fact that it
relates directly to the control involved in exercising corrective action.
It might be expected, therefore, that :tactile devices not related to the
control involved or a clearly identifiable hazard may not find ready
acceptance.
ANALYSIS AND COMMENT
In the preceding sec't±on, the discussion was almost exclusively confined
to the observations made by respondents during the survey. In this section
the information is Summarized, along with comments and analysis of the writer,
in order to develop the primary conclusions that have evolved from the study.
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Less commentaryis required for those guidelines and philosophies for which
there was general acceptance, while more attention is devoted to contro-
versial areas. Finally, a list of recommendations for investigation or
research by NASAis provided, representing the opinions of both the
respondents and the writer.
General
There appears to be validity in the conclusion that an excessive number
of individual warning signals is presently provided in many transport and
military aircraft. Fairly unanimousrecommendations that immediate action
warnings be reduced, that auditory signals be confined to four or five, and
that the large numbersand complex arrangements of caution/warning lights
be simplified and improved, certainly bear witness to this fact. The
proliferation of warning sounds and lights, all competing for pilots' atten-
tion and prime instrument panel space in the pilots' central cone of vision
is cited as compelling evidence of the need for reevaluation of the situation.
Considerable attention is therefore justified to studies of someof these
basic questions in order to improve the guidelines for future designs and to
correct design errors that appear to have been madein the past. A promising
solution for reducing the large numbersof warnings which could occur at any
given time lies in the use of somemethod for prioritizing and inhibiting
warnings by phase of flight.
The arguments for inhibiting and prioritizing warnings lie in the
potential for reducing somecrew overload conditions, and allowing faults or
errors to be handled one at a time in a systematic manner according to a
predetermined priority. Theoretically, this should lead to a decrease in
reaction time and to a reduced likelihood of inappropriate corrective action.
Risks are foreseen by somein not providing all warnings or caution
indications immediately as they arise. Oneargument is that we are not
intelligent enough to anticipate correctly the wisest priorities for all
possible combinations of possible warnings. The counter argument may be
that, if this is the case, we cannot expect a crew to resolve the same
question any better within secondswhile under the pressures of the
operational situation. Another argument against prioritization lies in the
fact that each type of aircraft is a unique design and no single system for
prioritizing will be possible; it will vary amongaircraft.
Advancedtechnology can contribute effectively to the solution.
Positive steps in this direction are reflected in current design trends
involving increased automation, digital computers, and electronic displays
in which information can be integrated and displayed in a variety of ways.
It is possible also that the requirements for manyof today's warnings
might be eliminated and a better solution provided by redesign of the cockpit
information display system for normal operations; here, too, currently
available computer and display technology could be utilized effectively. We
must recognize, however, that such redesign will progress rather slowly in
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actual application to transport aircraft and most likely will not be
incorporated as retrofit in existing models. In addition, potential for
improvement exists from better application of human factors doctrines in
defining, not only what information is present, but also how it is best
presented.
Work in this area should deal, not only with the details of the c/w
system, but also with other elements of the total operational situation. The
failure of flight crews to heed obvious warnings signals, of which there are
numerous exaraples, appears to be attributable, in significant measure, to the
frequent high level of cockpit workload. In such an environment, the number
of extra tasks that can be handled at a given time is reduced, and this
affects adversely the crew's ability to recognize and respond to information
not relating directly to the cause of the high workload. Obviously, the
factors contributing to high workload need to be identified and reduced or
eliminated to enable c/w systems to retain their effectiveness.
One additional factor that merits consideration as a contributor to the
general problem is that of the fundamental training concept identified as
"Basic Systems Only." A growing trend toward teaching "BSO" is believed by
some to encourage pilots to become undesirably warning dependent. Obviously,
the complexity of modern electro-mechanical-hydraulic systems makes it
impractical for flight crews to attempt to understand and retain minute
details of design, function, and performance. It is essential, however,
that they have sufficient knowledge to operate such systems with safety and
efficiency. How far the training of flight crews should go toward
providing a limited understanding of these complex systems is a gray area
which must be explored carefully. While there may be some basis for human
factors studies of this problem, it is considered primarily a subject for
manufacturers and airline training organizations and personnel and not one of
high priority for NASA study.
Reduce Number and Types of Warnings
Reduction in the complexity of warning systems, as evidenced by the
large numbers of both audio and visual indications, was the particular need
most frequently mentioned. Emphasis here should be on reducing the number
of immediate action warnings and the number of auditory signals. An
effective improvement method that deserves immediate attention would be to
inhibit unnecessary warnings on the basis of flight phase and to establish
a prioritizing systems for those retained. It is necessary, however, to
accept the fact that the pilot must remain in a position to make final
decisions regarding priorities; this poses the need to provide him with
sufficient information on simultaneous problems to enable him to evaluate
the overall situation properly.
In addition, it is important that some means be provided for cancellation
of warnings after they have served their primary purpose. Manual cancellation
by the pilot is only one means that could be used. As one of the'human
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factors elements that could be studied in this area, consideration should be
given to automatic cancellation or to intermittent warnings which allow
periods of respite from the alerting distraction.
One concept which appears to have merit is that, after cancellation of
the central warning, whether red or amber, the fault information be retained
on an auxiliary panel until corrected. The use of a flashing mode on the
auxiliary panel until the fault is corrected has somemerit in cases where
numerousfault indicators remain lighted on a given flight. In the case of
alpha-numeric messagedisplays, where emphasis is on readability of only one
or two messages, somemethod for storage and display of multiple faults must
be devised. Possible methods include the use of a single symbol at the end
of the messageor a recall capability wherein all existing faults may be
reactivated in the display, either sequentially as they occurred or on a
prioritized basis. The method used maydepend on whether the alpha-numeric
messageline or a CRTis employed. Determination of the best application of
each should be madeearly in the investigation.
Direct vs Indirect Cues
The use of direct cues, that is, of those that provide information
about corrective action, has been shownto reduce pilot reaction time by as
muchas 6 to 9 sec. While the value of reduced reaction time is obvious,
there does not seemto be sufficient evidence at this time to establish that
the meansused for alerting the pilot can or should always be a direct cue.
The potential value of direct cues over indirect ones, regardless of whether
they are auditory, visual, or tactile, appears to be great, however. The
direct cues which appear to provide the greatest potential are spoken or
written messages, labeled lights, digital computer messagesdisplayed on a
CRTor LEDtype display, and the stick-shaker.
There is considerable interest in and arguments for the use of audio
tones only for alerting purposes and possibly to convey the proper level of
warning. This would greatly simplify the use of warning soundsand enable
more rapid standardization once an acceptable meansfor providing one or
more direct cues is available in the cockpit. One argument against this
procedure is that an alerting method that does not provide a direct cue,
that is, unmistakable information on which the crew can act, results in
unnecessary delay.
In terms of possible retrofit and requiring the least redesign or space
requirements on the instrument panel, the most promising methods available
to improving the direct cues are voice and the alpha-numeric message
display.
Auditory
There is general consensus that the use of voice cues through verbalized
messagesappears to be the direct auditory cue that provides the greatest
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potential for payoff in future c/w systems. For this reason, it should be
given the highest priority in any research and development efforts. In
general, auditory signals have been considered, due to their compelling
nature, to be reserved for pilot failure modes or for a few critical
conditions or failures requiring immediate action or decision by the crew.
It appears possible that the use of verbalized messages could be more
widespread if the potential for conflict with other communications could be
minimized. In other words, voice messages could also provide an alternative
to reading a visual message for lower level warnings which do not require
immediate action or can be recalled at a time when the crew is not overloaded.
_q_ile much study has been given to the use of voice as to terminology,
message content, and other characteristics, very little research has been
conducted within the constraints of the operational situation, either simu-
lated or real. Future work should not only reconsider questions of the
message format and treatment of urgency level under simulated operational
conditions, but should do so both in prioritized and non-prioritized systems,
incorporating multiple failures, and in conjunction with an integrated but
separate visual warning system.
There was a clear indication that pilots prefer advisory information to
commands from voice warning. It is not clear yet how far this guideline
should be carried in the design of voice warning systems, but such
psychological aspects which affect individual response must be taken into
account. If we accept the philosophy that the final decision is made by the
on-board captain and crew, the issuance of "voice commands" by electro-
mechanical means is a contrary philosophy. If commands are treated as
advisory, with perhaps a level of urgency provided, the basic philosophy
remains intact. A comparison may also be made with the flight director which
is often referred to as a command instrument. If a pilot responds to every
movement of a flight director, his attention becomes so intense on this one
bit of information that his visual scan of other information is interrupted,
his workload goes up, and he becomes a slave to this one source of informa-
tion. If, on the other hand, he treats the flight director as a quickened
bit of advisory information, he still achieves satisfactory performance
without losing the scan pattern necessary to maintain situation awareness.
Visual
Although a well organized, systematized use of labeled lights has been
recognized as reasonable and acceptable, there are characteristics even here
which appear to warrant improvement. The question of readability under
operational conditions, stemming from relative size of the lettering or
cockpit lighting conditions, needs to be reconsidered in their design.
Specific attention should be directed to the question of readability and
clarity of visual messages under adverse lighting and vibration or turbulent
conditions. While there is the potential of providing great detail in visual
messages through computer displays, this must be balanced by the need for
conciseness and readability. Specific new technology which should be
evaluated includes the digital computer in conjunction with the concise
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message readout versus the total CRT display. It is possible that both
have a best application and may not be competitive in that sense.
The use of flashing lights and flashing display elements is in need of
a basic philosophy and guidelines for their use. The conflict regarding
their use arises from the fact that they are at the same time an excellent
means of attracting attention and that they may very easily become highly
distracting. Some of the answer may lie in limiting the flashing period
and using flashing lights only for alerting purposes, or perhaps as a means
of identifying a level of urgency. On the other hand, the use of flashing
yellow lights, as on an annunciator panel, appears to provide an excellent
method of indicating that a fault remains uncorrected, while permitting the
cancellation of a central warning. The use of a flashing mode in display
elements to indicate unreliable information has apparent merit, but the
concept must be reconciled with the use of flashing lights in warning systems.
The common parameter in each, however, appears to be that of drawing
attention.
Multiple Cues
This leads to the question of multiple cues. In order to ensure that a
warning is not overlooked, experience suggests that there is merit in
providing multiple channels of information, that is, auditory, plus visual,
or either of these plus tactile. While evidence to date indicates that
multiple channels are required to ensure that pilots under high workload
conditions have a_ increased capability for recognizing and responding to a
warning, the possibility exists, with verbalized, digitized and printed CRT
message concepts, for providing significant improvements in information
content. These, plus improvements in the concepts for alerting the pilot,
may make it possible to reduce such duplication and still achieve satis-
factory results. Such a consideration should at least be a potential goal
for any research and development program. Recommendations have been made
that auditory signals be reserved for alerting purposes and visual signals
be used for action, but there does not appear to be sufficient evidence at
this time to warrant such a broad concept.
Uniform Standards and Guidelines
The strong plea made by respondents for improved standards and guide-
lines for warning systems is seen as an indication of their importance. It
was evident that the military standards have been an important source of
whatever standardization exists today. Their usefulness extends also to
civil aviation where they can be used as guidelines without the effect of
becoming requirements.
In this regard, NASA should work closely with the FAA, and with Boeing,
who is conducting studies under FAA sponsorship, to identify and provide
support for updating those standards in need of updating. This will tend to
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ensure that NASAresearch is conducted in a mannerand within a time frame
that will provide maximumapplication and hence the greatest return in terms
of improvements in cockpit warning systems.
Standards under development by the SAES-7 Committee can provide an
important step in this direction, largely because they will not have the
effect of regulations, thereby enabling achievement of standardization by
consensusand agreement without discouraging development. Despite the
indicated value of the military standards, even the military agree they
require updating and improving. During the survey only a few of the conflicts
within the military standards were identified. An effort should be madeto
review these standards in detail, identifying all areas where changemaybe
required, and a singular effort established to update them. Someform of
coordination with the SAES-7 Committee in this regard would seemdesirable.
Oneof the first places to begin standardization is in the terminology
being used. This is currently a subject under study by the S-7 Committee.
It is important for NASAto keep abreast of these developments so that
current, revised, and approved terminology is used throughout any research
and development program.
Additional specific areas where new guidelines are needed in order to
enhance future development are redefinition of categories or levels of
warnings and the standardization of a few auditory signals which may be used
either as alerting tones, with or without verbalized message, or as the few
standard warnings that are universally applied to a few items, such as
landing gear and fire. Improved guidelines are also needed to clarify the
use of flashing lights in c/w systems, as is redefinition of the use of
colored lights in order to retain the concept of a dark cockpit during
normal operation.
Reliability
It has been shown that reliability is a significant determinant of the
effectiveness of c/w systems. A c/w system is equally unreliable whether it
malfunctions -- to produce false fire warnings -- or whether it is so
designed or adjusted, with respect to limits, that it produces repeated
nuisance warnings. An unfortunate illustration of the latter problem is
afforded by the recent accelerated introduction of the GPWSinto operational
service without adequate preparation and evaluation. While remarkable
progress has been made in achieving a high level of reliability with
avionics systems, still more progress must be madeif warning systems are to
be accepted and used effectively by flight crews.
Experimental studies involving new technology are, of course, very
important, but they should not be conducted at the expense of comparative
studies involving labeled lights and auditory signals, with and without
verbalized warnings. Improved guidelines and recommendations for the
application of these systems may be significant in improving current cockpits.
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Evaluation Procedures
Perhaps the greatest deficiency in the past implementation of cockpit
warning system has been a lack of objective evaluation under realistic
operational conditions. Suchan evaluation can be accomplished most
expeditiously by using current advanced training simulators and full mission
simulation techniques. Suchprograms are expensive, require a broad effort
to implement, and require extensive data recording and reduction efforts.
For these reasons, such full mission evaluation studies should probably be
confined to the final evaluation phase of either new designs or comparative
studies. They should be preceded by systematic experimental studies,
beginning with simple laboratory experiments to separate the large number of
variables or concepts possible and to understand the important differences
betweenalerting and informing for decision.
This focuses attention on the desirability of looking at c/w systems as
very general in nature, incorporating not only the immediate action warning,
but also the deferred or nonaction transfer of information to the pilot and
crew, such as caution, advisories, and status indicators. These, then,
relate to categories or levels of warnings based upon criticality or response
required. Another aspect of importance appears to be the separation of the
alerting function from the information part of the warning message. There
could be value in considering a warning in terms of alerting, informing of
the problem, and information relative to decision and action. It is
suggested that the requirements of these three phases maydiffer. Is the use
of a direct cue, for example, expected to accomplish all three? Or is
alerting a separate function which might more clearly provide an alert if
separated from the need to inform and generation of decision and action.
Perhaps further experimental studies will be required to provide answers to
these questions and to the desirability of adhering to a current military
standards that require any warning to be preceded by an alerting signal or
tone. Military standards also explicitly require a nonverbal signal to
precede a verbal warning.
Studies involving basic humanfactors and specific warning systems
should consider those standards already outlined in the Mil. Stds. 411 and
1472 for specific confirmation or rejection of existing information.
The next phase should be part-task simulation studies which involve
combinations of the basic elements of cockpit warning systems for which a
more refined comparison or evaluation is required. These will provide
insight into the secondary advantages or disadvantages of specific elements
but would not be expected to provide valid reaction times nor comprehension
under realistic or high workload conditions.
The fundamental performance measure in investigations of c/w systems is
the pilot reaction time for proper response; this obviously involves
considerations of comprehensibility and proper interpretation. Research
data appear to be needed in order to define more authentic and realistic
reaction times to warnings, particularly in the context of the total
operational environment. A controversy over what should be accepted as
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minimumresponse time maybe related to the latter factor: i sec is
recognized by the FAA, the CAAsays 2 sec, and various pilot groups say it
should be more like 6 to 7 sec. This question obviously warrants study.
A review of the problems and recommendationsobtained during this
survey should provide a basis for research and development progressing from
(I) specific elementary experiments to (2) part-task simulations involving
more complete systems, and (3) a full mission simulation study involving
two or more basic systems composedof subsystemsselected from the results
of (2). This is illustrated in table 4.
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TABLE4.- EXAMPLEOFSYSTEMATICINVESTIGATIONOFCOCKPIT
WARNINGSYSTEMSCONCEPTS
Specific laboratory
experiments or studies
involving c/w systems
elements
What are 5 best
auditory signals?
Should auditory signals
be confined to
immediate action? i
Should auditory signals,
including voice, incor-
porate urgency? How?
Should alerting signal
be used with voice?
Should alerting signal,
if used, be continuous,
push to cancel, or
auto-cancel?
What standards are de-
sired for voice warning
messagecontext?
What are best methods
for indicating multiple
warnings and prioritizin
for single voice
generators?
Part-task simulation
studies involving
c/w subsystemswith
important cockpit
environment
Part Task
Simulation I
Scenario designed
to evaluate
experimental
results
Part Task
Simulation II
Scenario designed
to evaluate
experimental
results
Full mission simulation
studies to evaluate
and comparecomplete
c/w systems composed
of most promising
subsystems
Full Mission
Simulation
Scenario designed
to evaluate tenta-
tive conclusions
from Part Task Simu-
lator Evaluations I
and II and additional
scenario content in
footnote.
Note: Also included in full mission scenarios would be results from similar
systematic investigation of labeled lights, visual messagedisplay,
CRTapplications, etc.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Each visit was concluded with a request for specific recommendations
for investigation or research pertaining to warning and alerting. In this
section are listed the primary recommendations received, some of which were
specifically designated for NASA action.
General
I. NASA simulation data and support is needed on c/w systems.
• NASA should be concerned with concepts only and not specific de-
signs.
• NASA effort should concentrate on providing data to guide and
assist industry in the design of c/w systems.
o The need for new equipment pertaining to c/w systems should be
confirmed by ensuring that it will accomplish its desired task
before making it a requirement.
. NASA should provide objective evaluation of cockpit systems,
including c/w, and should utilize full mission simulation in
comparative testing of warning system concepts.
. NASA should provide basic human factors data for use by industry
(e.g., realistic reaction times, acceleration thresholds, types of
alarms, etc.). This should include determination of what
functions a flashing light, bell, audio tones, and voice are best
used for. It should also include an evaluation of methods for
indicating the level of warning.
. The adequacy of methods by which pilots and copilots monitor each
other should be determined. The relative merits of automatic
monitoring and pilot monitoring should be determined.
6. Methods for cancelling both red and yellow master warning lights
and warning tone or voice messages should be evaluated.
Auditory
i. Develop and evaluate the use of voice warning in c/w systems,
including the use of a single voice generator
2. Conduct evaluations of voice warning in conjunction with a visual
master warning panel system
4O
..
.
.
o
Develop and evaluate a standardized voice warning system for
inclusion in all aircraft; supplement this with a master c/w
panel system as on the B-I
Evaluate the use of modulated versus flat tone voice warning as
well as methods for conveying a sense of urgency
Investigate the removal of the annunciator panel from prime panel
space by supplementing with voice
Develop and evaluate standardized tones and guidelines for landing
gear warning
Determine and evaluate a single master warning sound to alert for
all critical items
8. Determine five best audio sounds for basic standard auditory signals
• Determine if these auditory signals should be limited to
potentially catastrophic or most urgent situations only
• Determine if these auditory signals should be reserved for
crew failure only
it
o
,
0
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Visual
Criteria should be redefined for what constitutes red, yellow,
blue, green, or white light and for the use of LED colored lights.
Investigate whether a third color is needed in addition to red and
yellow for warnings and cautions.
Brightness, contrast, and visibility of visual c/w elements should
be investigated under a variety of cockpit lighting and vibration
conditions.
Visual warning systems need to be evaluated under conditions of high
ambient light due to fog in low visibility approaches.
Evaluate techniques for determining brightness, contrast, and color
compliance with specifications.
6. Investigate the use of flashing lights and determine the best
application in a c/w system. Resolve existing conflicts in their
use.
7. Investigate the use of a condensed alpha-numeric word display in
conjunction with voice warning and contrast with a CRT display
plus voice.
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8. Investigate best ways of displaying c/w information on a CRT.
• For systems information and checklists
• For automated checklists
• Other applications
9. CRT use should be investigated for display of warning information
on a priority basis, with written instructions on action to be
taken.
Tactile
i. More tactile warnings should be developed and evaluated.
i.
.
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Multiple Cues
NASA should investigate and demonstrate the complementary use of
voice warning and alerting with a visual system incorporating first,
an alpha-numeric message readout, then with a standard labeled light
system, then with a CRT display.
A need exists for development of the logic for prioritizing c/w
information and for redundancy requirements. Investigate and
resolve methods for prioritizing messages.
Kinds and number of warnings that a pilot can prioritize should be
determined, as should information on how pilots do prioritize
information received.
NASA should conduct studies to enable a change in Federal Aviation
Rules against prioritizing of c/w signals.
Methods should be developed and evaluated for incorporating or
relating the control involved with each urgent warning.
The use of auditory signals, including voice, should be evaluated
against a visual system to determine effectiveness or deficiencies
under conditions of high workload.
Uniform Standards and Guidelines
_i. Mil. Stds. 1472 and 411 need revising, with emphasis on rationale
behind them.
° Standards and guidelines for c/w system design are needed for
transport aircraft. A needed revision of SAE 450C, "Visual,
Audible and Tactile Signals on the Flight Deck," is in progress.
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NewWarning Systems
i. The need for attitude warning should be determined .....
2. A computerized system is needed which makes the potential of
collision evident only when there is high probability of collision.
3. A method is needed for integrating the GPWSor other add-on c/w
items such as turbulence, wind shear, collision potential, or
attitude into a central warning system.
Io
o
.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
This report is based primari]y upon the information obtained during
visits to 22 aviation organizations. The result of these visits were
summarizedin separate trip reports which comprise the primary source
material for this report. (Items 1-22) While muchadditional work has been
done on the subject of c/w systems and a bibliography of additional reference
material was developed, it was considered too detailed for inclusion with
this report and not pertinent to the specific objective of obtaining first-
hand information from the industry.
Trip Reports Relative to Aircraft Warning and Alerting Systems:
i. Visit to Boeing Airplane Co., Seattle, Washington, October 18, 1975.
2. Visit to VFWFokker, Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam,The Netherlands,
November6, 7, 1975.
3. Visit to Aerospatiale, Toulouse, France, November14, 1975.
4. Visit to the Civil Aviation Authority, Redhill, England,
November20, 1975.
5. Visit to the British Aircraft Corporation, Flight Test Department,
Fairford, England, November 21, 1975.
6. Visit to Rockwell International, Los Angeles International Airport,
E1 Segundo, California, March 3, 1976.
7. Visit to Lockheed California Company, Burbank, California,
March 4, 197_6.
8. Visit to McDonnell-Douglas, Long Beach, California, March 4, 1976.
9. Visit to McDonnell-Douglas, St. Louis, Missouri, March 23, 1976.
I0. Visit to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio,
March 24, 25, 1976.
ii. Visit to the Navy Safety Center, NAS, Norfolk, Virginia,
April 5, 1976.
12. Visit to meeting of the SAE S-7 Committee, Washington Hilton Hotel,
Washington, D. C., April 6, 7, 1976.
13. Visit to FAA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., April 8, 1976.
14. Visit to the Grumman Aerospace Company, New York, April 9, 1976..
15. 'Visit to Joint Test Force for the B-I, Edwards Air Force Base,
California, May 13, 1976.
4_
16. Visit to USAFDirectorate of Aerospace Safety, Norton Air Force
Base, California, May 14, 1976.
17. Visit to Sperry Flight Systems, Phoenix, Arizona, May 17, 1976.
18. Visit to Cessna Aircraft Co., Wichita, Kansas, May 25, 1976.
19. Visit to Beech Aircraft Co., Wichita, Kansas, May 25, 1976.
20. Visit to General DynamicsCorporation, Fort Worth, Texas,
May 26, 1976.
21. Visit to NASA,Johnson Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas,
May 27, 1976.
22. Visit to NASA,AmesResearch Center, Moffett Field, California,
June 1976.
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